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1.1 Introduction 
 
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, investors became increasingly concerned 
about the financial outlook of a number of countries, including several in the euro 
area.1 During the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, a number of politicians 
and regulators accused speculators of using uncovered (or ‘naked’) sovereign credit 
default swaps (‘CDSs’) to exacerbate the fiscal problems of many countries, including 
Greece, through raising the borrowing costs of governments. The sovereign debt crisis 
sparked the interest of regulators and the sovereign CDS provisions in the 2012 
European Short Selling Regulation (the ‘Regulation’) were predominantly due to the 
perception that naked sovereign CDS activity contributed to Europe’s sovereign debt 
problems and that the speculative use of sovereign CDSs could destabilise markets. 
The final rules were highly contested, and were largely a consequence of political 
pressures stemming from particular Member States, supported by the European 
Parliament (the ‘Parliament’).2 This included the Parliament’s persistent demands 
with respect to imposing a ban on uncovered sovereign CDSs.3 
 
Although the EU regime is now relatively well established, the issue of short selling 
regulation continues to be a hot topic today, especially when one reflects on the 
temporary short selling bans imposed by the Greek authorities during 2015 as the 
country teetered on the brink of financial collapse. Likewise, Chinese regulators also 
recently pointed the finger of blame at ‘malicious’ short sellers when its stock market 
experienced dramatic declines during the summer months of 2015. The Chinese 
authorities (amongst other measures) imposed short selling restrictions, and instigated 
a range of market manipulation probes. 
 
Further, in a broader context, the developments being observed with respect to short 
selling regulation at the European level also form part of a wider set of regulatory 
changes witnessed in relation to European capital markets regulation following the 
recent crises. Specifically, the rules that were in existence at the time of the market 
downturn were considered inadequate to cope with the various new financial players 
and products, many that were perceived to constitute a threat to market stability.4 
Consequently, the crises prompted the EU down the path of more intensive regulation, 
and its initial regulatory response included a particular focus on establishing financial 
                                                
1 BIS, ‘Intraday Dynamics of Euro Area Sovereign CDS and Bonds’ (BIS Working Paper No 423, 
September 2013) 5. 
2 See e.g. Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, Letter to President of the European Commission (8 
June 2010); European Parliament, Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps (19 April 2011). 
3 See e.g. European Parliament, Crack Down on Short Selling and Sovereign Debt Speculation (18 
October 2011). 
4 Niamh Moloney, ‘Reform or Revolution? The Financial Crisis, EU Financial Markets Law, and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority’ (2011) 60 ICLQ 521, 524. 
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and market stability. Such reforms also expanded the EU’s regulatory perimeter to 
bring within it issues (including the practice of short selling) considered in need of 
regulation at the EU level. Today, although the high watermark of the post-crisis 
reforms may now have passed, the kernels of yet a further wave of changes are now 
also observable. For instance, current proposals include a push to try and widen 
companies’ financing sources through the EU’s Capital Markets Union project.5  
 
With this background in mind, this paper provides an overview of sovereign credit 
default swaps (‘CDSs’) and their uses and seeks to place the concerns raised about 
sovereign CDSs in context through a consideration of the relevant economic 
literature. It then examines the requirements introduced by the Regulation that 
effectively prohibit naked sovereign CDSs.6 Broadly speaking, the rules only permit 
entering into such a transaction where it does not lead to an uncovered position in a 
sovereign CDS. This then depends on whether the CDS constitutes a permitted hedge. 
Aside from ‘pure’ hedging against the risk of decline in the value of the sovereign 
debt, permissible hedging includes ‘proxy’ hedging (i.e. hedging risks of other assets 
whose value is correlated to the value of the sovereign debt). However, in this regard 
there are a complex set of requirements to be complied with including geographical 
constraints, correlation and proportionality tests. During the Regulation’s protracted 
negotiations, the Parliament was also forced to concede to a temporary opt-out from 
the restrictions if the ban was damaging the government debt market. 
 
Although the regulator demonstrated a level of sophistication in recognising that there 
is more than one way to carry out a short sale, this paper suggests that the 
Regulation’s restrictions are a ‘misconceived response to a non-existent problem’.7 
There are many benefits to using sovereign CDSs and little to substantiate the 
accusations that developments in such markets led to higher funding costs for 
sovereign issuers during the crisis.8 Indeed the rules that have been introduced not 
only prohibit uncovered positions but also restrict much legitimate hedging activity. 
More generally, the rules may reduce investor interest in the underlying bond markets 
in many countries and so may come at the detriment of the sovereign issuers that the 
restrictions were in fact seeking to protect.9   
 
1.2 Terminology: Overview of Credit Derivatives and CDSs 
 
A credit derivative is a general term used to describe various swap and option 
contracts designed to assume or lay off credit risk on loans, debt securities or other 
                                                
5 See e.g. European Commission Communication, ‘Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union’ 
(COM(2015) 468 final). 
6 Note that for ease of reference, a table containing some pertinent terms is attached as Appendix 1 to 
this paper.  
7 Alexandros Seretakis, ‘Taming the Locusts? Embattled Hedge Funds in the EU’ (2013) 10 NYU 
Journal of Law & Business 115, 146. 
8  Notably a 2012 report on the CDS market by the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (‘IOSCO’) stated that there was no conclusive evidence on whether taking short 
positions on credit risk through naked sovereign CDSs was harmful for high-yield sovereign bonds, see 
IOSCO, ‘The Credit Default Swap Market Report’ (June 2012) 38. 
9 AIMA, The European Sovereign CDS Market (2011) 17. 
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assets, or in relation to a particular reference entity or country, in return for either 
swap payments or payment of premium.10 Credit risk arises from the possibility of 
default on a pre-agreed payment and the transfer of credit risk is achieved through the 
payment obligations of the seller of the swap (also referred to as the ‘protection 
seller’) that are triggered by specified events of default (‘credit events’) affecting 
defined assets (also known as ‘reference assets’) or defined entities (also known as 
‘reference entities’) such as a government or corporate issuer.11  
 
Turning to CDSs, these instruments were conceived as OTC products, and are quoted 
in basis points12 per year. A CDS price indicates the cost per year to buy or sell 
exposure to the possibility of a default or restructuring.13  Under the terms of a CDS 
contract (that will be laid out in documentation using standard forms),14 the purchaser 
of the CDS (also known as the ‘protection buyer’) will be obliged to make specified 
fee payments (often referred to as the ‘insurance premium’ or ‘CDS spread’) on an 
annual basis to the protection seller. The level of protection is usually expressed in 
terms of a ‘notional’ amount that is being protected and the length of time for which 
the notional amount is being protected.15   
 
Specifically with respect to a sovereign CDS agreement, the seller will receive the 
premium in exchange for bearing the risk of capital losses if a pre-defined default 
event occurs (including the sovereign’s failure to pay interest or principal on an 
obligation) in relation to the referenced sovereign entity and a predefined notional 
amount.16 Sovereign CDS contracts are usually denominated in a currency different 
from the main currency of the deliverable obligations as it is assumed that if faced 
with a credit event, the local currency will come under pressure.17 CDSs on euro area 
sovereigns tend to be denominated in US dollars. 
 
To put these terms in context, if one party wishes to purchase protection on the 
notional amount of USD one hundred million of debt issued by a sovereign for five 
years, and the agreed CDS rate is five per cent per year, the party will pay a yearly 
premium to the protection seller of USD five million. If a credit event occurs in the 
five years, the seller will give the buyer the difference between the referenced debt 
                                                
10 Joanna Benjamin, Financial Law (Oxford University Press 2007) para 4.51. 
11  Ibid para 4.51; Commission, ‘Task Force Report on Sovereign CDS’, 7 
<http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ReportonsovereignCDS12072010.pdf 
(http://perma.cc/6YFM-4ATV)> accessed 20 August 2013. 
12 For further details, see Appendix 1. 
13 Commission (n 11) 8. 
14 The standard forms are most often produced by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(‘ISDA’). 
15 AIMA (n 9) 20.  
16 Ibid 20. Note that in March 2012, the restructuring of Greek sovereign debt triggered payments by 
protection sellers of approximately USD 2.89 billion. Although there were concerns that a large flow of 
payments to buyers of CDS protection could have had a material systemic impact on the financial 
system at large (this was particularly related to the possibly high concentration of the exposures on a 
few protection sellers), the impact of the credit event was remarkably low. See e.g. Helen Cunningham, 
‘DTCC Helps Ensure 'Uneventful' Greek CDS Payout’ DTCC (1 May 2012); IOSCO (n 8) 15-18.    
17 BIS (n 1) 5. 
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and the market value of the defaulted debt. For example, if, due to the credit event, the 
debt now has only a market value of only USD thirty million, the buyer will collect 
USD seventy million from the seller.18   
 
Where an investor purchases a sovereign CDS without having some kind of exposure 
to the credit risk associated with the underlying bond (i.e. where the investor does not 
hold the debt instruments or have some exposure to the debt), this is described as 
having an uncovered or naked sovereign CDS.19  
 
1.2.1  Uses of Sovereign CDSs 
Owners of sovereign debt purchase sovereign CDSs as a direct hedging tool in order 
to protect them from loss arising from a default or other credit event affecting the 
value of the underlying sovereign debt.20 Sovereign CDSs can also be used for 
arbitrage opportunities (i.e. the risk-free exploitation of price differences in connected 
markets) in government bond markets. 21   Traders can try and exploit pricing 
differences between CDSs and the underlying debt obligations by taking offsetting 
positions between the two (known as ‘basis trading’).22   
 
Naked sovereign CDSs are also often purchased as ‘proxy’ risk management tools in 
order to hedge risks of other assets, such as national banks or utility companies whose 
value is correlated to the value of the sovereign debt.23 For instance, if one invests in a 
national airline and wants to protect against the downside risk of a sovereign crisis 
affecting the airline, one could purchase a sovereign CDS without owning the 
underlying government debt.24 Similarly sovereign CDSs are also often used as a 
proxy to hedge positions in analogous positions (e.g. in bank debt) for which a CDS 
may not be traded (or may be highly illiquid and therefore expensive).25 Such 
positions help fill a gap by allowing investors to hedge country or sector specific risks 
and also support projects that would not be financed otherwise.26 Although, as will be 
observed at section 1.5 below, the EU provisions aim to ensure that legitimate proxy 
                                                
18 Darrell Duffie, ‘Is There a Case for Banning Short Speculation in Sovereign Bond Markets?’ 
(Financial Stability Review, July 2010) 56. Settlement can also be either in cash or by physical 
settlement although CDS contracts are typically cash settled. 
19 Commission (n 11) 7. 
20 IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (April 2013) 3. 
21 Ibid 3 and Annex 2; European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying Document to the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Short Selling and Certain 
Aspects of Credit Default Swaps SEC(2010) 1055 15. 
22 IMF (n 20) 3 and Annex 2; Impact Assessment (n 21) 15. See Appendix 1 for further details. See 
also section 1.3 below. 
23 IMF (n 20) 3. 
24 IMF, IMF Staff Comments on Commission Consultation on Short Selling (August 2010) 7. 
25 FSA, HMT and Debt Management Office, Joint FSA/HMT/Debt Management Office Response to the 
European Commission Public Consultation on Short Selling (2010) 10.  
26 Thomas del Marmol, ‘Short Selling: Need or Fear? Impact on Financial Markets and Implications for 
Regulation’ 2011, 58 <http://www.professionsfinancieres.com/docs/2012102306_174_vn_m_short-
selling.-need-or-fear.pdf> accessed 20 June 2013. 
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hedging activity can still be classified as ‘covered’ positions, the many uncertainties 
introduced by the complex European rules mean such activity may simply become too 
cumbersome or costly to be worthwhile for market participants. 
 
Finally, purchasing a naked sovereign CDS can also be used to reflect a negative 
opinion about the credit outlook of the sovereign issuer of the underlying bonds. 27 It 
is economically equivalent to short selling the underlying bonds, and both naked CDS 
purchases and short selling bonds provide useful functions by increasing the liquidity 
of the underlying markets.28 Further, naked CDS purchases also help to keep prices 
from only reflecting the activity of only the most optimistic market participants.29  
 
Naked sovereign CDSs provide a relatively simple mechanism for taking a short 
position and reflecting a negative view of the evolving credit risk associated with a 
sovereign reference entity: they are a ‘highly visible bellwether of a country’s 
perceived credit risk’.30 Although other mechanisms can also be used to express views 
on the credit risk associated with a sovereign issuer (including short selling the 
underlying bonds or using other derivatives), such instruments can also reflect other 
risk as well as credit risk.31 In contrast, the CDS market is more standardised: for 
example sovereign CDSs on Greece all have the unique reference, which is the credit 
risk of Greece.32 Equally, there is not the same required outlay to enter into a short 
position on the CDS market that there is with purchasing a bond.33 Finally, in general 
terms, it can often be harder to short sell bonds than to purchase a naked CDS.34 
Indeed this is particularly the case in the corporate bond market where there the 
secondary market is often illiquid.35 In contrast however, the government bond 
markets are generally much more liquid than their corporate counterparts meaning the 
bond market may play a bigger role for sovereigns.36  
 
1.2.2 Size of the Sovereign CDS Market 
                                                
27 IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 3, 19. 
28 Ibid 19. 
29 Ibid 19. 
30 AIMA (n 9) 5. CDS prices provide useful information about the credit risk of an entity and the CDS 
price theoretically reflects the credit risk of the reference entity, see Marmol (n 26) 25.  
31 IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 3. For instance there can be 
interest rate risk attached to bonds.  
32 Impact Assessment (n 21) 16.  
33 Ibid 16. 
34 For instance one needs to be able to borrow a sufficient quantity of bonds and deep repurchase 
agreement (‘repo’) markets in which to borrow them, IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit 
Default Swaps (n 20) 19. 
35 Virginie Coudert and Mathieu Gex, ‘The Interactions between the Credit Default Swap and the Bond 
Markets in Financial Turmoil’ (2013) 21 Review of International Economics 492, 493, 499-500. 
Corporate issuers may also have different bonds with varying maturities leading to high fragmentation 
of the secondary market. See Marmol (n 26) 24. 
36 Coudert and Gex (n 35) 495. However the funding conditions and liquidity of the government bond 
market can vary from state to state. 
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Turning to examine the size of the sovereign CDS market in more detail, this section 
will illustrate that the sovereign CDS market is only a relatively minor part of the 
overall CDS market, which is itself only a small part of the OTC derivatives market. 
Further, sovereign CDSs are only a small fraction of the total government debt 
outstanding.37 It is also helpful to keep this in mind in section 1.3 below that will then 
examine whether sovereign CDS prices are in fact capable of manipulating bond 
prices. 
 
There are two basic measures of the size of the CDS market: the gross notional 
amount and the net notional amount. The gross notional amount is the total of all 
transactions that have not yet matured, prior to taking into consideration offsetting 
transactions between pairs of counterparties. However this measure can be misleading 
as it can significantly overstate the size of the market.38  For instance, market 
participants will commonly enter into offsetting transactions, and this will raise the 
number of outstanding transactions, resulting in an increase in the overall gross 
notional amounts. 
 
Instead, the net notional amount takes into account all offsetting transactions between 
pairs of counterparties. For instance if an investor has bought protection on USD 10 
million of sovereign debt and decides to reduce this position to USD 4 million, it will 
enter into a new offsetting CDS agreement to sell protection on USD 6 million of 
sovereign debt and the investor’s net position will then be USD 4 million.39 The net 
notional amount is the basis for calculating the net notional payment in the event of a 
credit event and represents the maximum amount that could change hands if the 
reference entity defaults.40 This is a more realistic measure as an increase in net 
notional exposure indicates there is increased demand for credit risk protection.41 
 
1.2.2.1 BIS: Size of the CDS Market within the OTC Market 
 
The Bank for International Settlements (‘BIS’) provides information on a semi-annual 
basis with respect to the OTC derivatives market.42  This data helps provide a general 
overview of the size of the CDS, and sovereign CDS market, particularly in 
comparison with the overall OTC derivatives market. Nonetheless the data also 
                                                
37 IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 4. 
38 Commission (n 11) 10. 
39 Duffie (18) 56. 
40 Commission (n 11) 10-11; AIMA (n 9) 13. 
41 AIMA (n 9) 14. 
42  BIS, ‘OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-December 2013: Statistical Release’ (Monetary and 
Economic Department, May 2014). Central banks and other authorities from 13 jurisdictions 
participate in this survey (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the US). The market share of dealers who participate in the 
survey varies but is almost 100% in the credit category, see ibid 10. Although BIS also conducted a 
triennial survey reflecting end-June 2013, BIS noted that dealers participating in the semi-annual 
survey accounted for almost all outstanding CDS contracts, see BIS, ‘OTC Derivatives Statistics at 
End-June 2013: Statistical Release’ (Monetary and Economic Department, November 2013) 3. 
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suffers from limitations: it only provides aggregate market statistics, and is based on 
surveys rather than actual registered positions in the market.43   
 
Although in 2007, CDSs came close to surpassing foreign exchange derivatives as the 
second largest segment in the global OTC derivatives market, notional amounts of all 
CDSs have since declined steadily.44 For instance, according to the BIS semi-annual 
survey, by the end of 2013 the global OTC derivatives market constituted 
approximately USD 710.2 trillion, and the gross notional amount outstanding of the 
total CDS market was approximately USD 21 trillion (approximately 3 per cent of the 
total OTC market), down from its peak of approximately USD 58 trillion at the end of 
2007.45 CDSs constituted the third segment in the OTC derivatives market with 
interest rate derivatives accounting for the majority of OTC derivatives, followed by 
foreign exchange derivatives. By sector, sovereign CDSs constituted only 
approximately USD 2.6 trillion of all CDSs at the end of 2013 in terms of gross 
notional amounts outstanding: approximately 12.53 per cent of the CDS market.46  
 
1.2.2.2 Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (‘DTCC’) Data  
 
The DTCC provides information on CDSs at the reference entity level.47 According to 
the DTCC, their data captures approximately 95 per cent of globally traded CDSs 
making it the most accurate and comprehensive publicly available dataset for CDS 
positions and trading.48 
 
Since October 2008 the DTCC has provided weekly CDS position data, disclosing the 
aggregate gross notional as well as the aggregate net notional outstanding on a 
particular reference entity. At the end of 2008, the top ten outstanding net notional 
sovereign CDS positions included the following EU sovereigns: Italy, USD 18 billion; 
Spain, USD 14 billion, Germany USD 10 billion; and Greece, USD 7 billion.49  In 
contrast, by the end of 2010, the sovereign CDS market had increased in size, for 
                                                
43 Martin Oehmke and Adam Zawadowski, ‘The Anatomy of the CDS Market’ Working Paper, 
September 2014, 8 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2023108 
(http://perma.cc/BE5J-YDK3)> accessed 10 October 2014. Hence it runs the related risk of double 
counting. 
44 Note that for an overview of the forthcoming data in tabular form, plus a comparison between 2013 
and 2011, see Appendix 2, Table 1. 
45 BIS, ‘OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-December 2013: Statistical Release’ (n 42) 7. This figure 
includes single and multi-name instruments. Note that to an extent the overall reduction in the size of 
outstanding CDS positions since 2007 has been assisted by the industry technique of ‘trade tear-ups’ or 
‘portfolio compression’.  For further details, see Appendix 1. The decline in overall CDS activity over 
the years has also been due to a contraction in inter-dealer activity, see BIS, ‘OTC Derivatives 
Statistics at End-June 2013: Statistical Release’ (n 42) 5. 
46 Percentages calculated based on the information in the BIS Statistical Release (May 2014). Out of 
2.6 trillion, approximately 2.5 trillion were single name sovereign CDSs.  
47 All major dealers register their standard CDS trades with the DTCC who enters these into a Trade 
Information Warehouse (‘TIW’). 
48 Oehmke and Zawadowski (n 43) 8. For an overview of the forthcoming data in tabular form, see 
Appendix 2, Tables 2a-2c. 
49 IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 4. Figures drawn from 
DTCC data and IMF calculations. 
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instance the top ten positions outstanding included Italy, USD 26 billion; France, 
USD 18 billion; Spain, USD 17 billion; Germany USD 15 billion; UK, USD 12 
billion; Portugal, USD 8 billion; and Austria, USD 7 billion.50   
 
However, while the market has undoubtedly increased in importance since 2008, it is 
still small in terms of its relative size to the government debt market. For example, the 
International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) calculated that there was approximately USD 50 
trillion total government debt outstanding at the end of 2011.51 In contrast there were 
only approximately USD 3 trillion sovereign CDSs outstanding at that time.52  
Similarly, a 2012 report on the CDS market by the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions (‘IOSCO’) observed that the size of the CDS market relative 
to public debt for euro area sovereigns had remained relatively stable since 2008, 
contrary to the perception that the debt crisis had increased the demand of CDSs for 
hedging purposes.53 Indeed IOSCO also noted that the ratio of net notional to public 
debt had remained stable or actually decreased for countries more exposed to the 
crisis including Greece, Ireland and Portugal.54  
 
As observed at the start of this section, this data helps to illustrate that the sovereign 
CDS market is only a small part of the overall CDS market, which itself is only a 
minor segment of the OTC derivatives market. Further, sovereign CDSs represent 
only a small fraction of the total government debt outstanding.55 It is useful to keep 
these points in mind when moving to examine the interaction between the sovereign 
CDS and bond markets in section 1.3. Finally, and more generally, given the very 
small size of the sovereign CDS market, it is also relevant to ask whether this market 
should have been such a concern for regulators, particularly in comparison with other, 
much larger, derivatives markets. 
 
1.3 Interaction between the Sovereign CDS and Bond Markets 
 
1.3.1 Introduction  
                                                
50 Greece was below the top ten outstanding positions at USD 6 billion. The prominence of Italy could 
have reflected dealers hedging counterparty risk associated with large uncollateralised OTC 
transactions with Italy. Likewise the increased amount of sovereign CDS activity referencing Germany 
and the UK reflected them serving as a safe haven trade or proxy hedge. Ibid 4-5. 
51 This was defined as an aggregate of the general government debt that had notional amounts 
outstanding in terms of sovereign CDSs. 
52 IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 4; BIS, ‘OTC Derivatives 
Statistics at End-June 2012: Statistical Release’ (Monetary and Economic Department, June 2012), 
Table 7 (gross notional amount). 
53 IOSCO (n 8) 7-9. 
54 Ibid 9. 
55 IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 4. Indeed, also compare the 
figures with earlier data produced by the Hedge Fund Standards Board (‘HFSB’). The HFSB noted that 
at the end of 2009, CDSs constituted only 5 per cent of the overall OTC derivatives market (gross 
figures), sovereign CDSs constituted approximately only 11% of the overall CDS market (net figures) 
in April 2010, and that the sovereign CDS market was small in terms of relative size to government 
debt (sovereign CDSs were approximately 1 per cent of government debt) in May 2010, see HFSB, 
HFSB Response to the European Commission Public Consultation on Short Selling (2010) 8. 
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As already observed, during the sovereign debt crisis, politicians and regulators 
contended that the interaction between the bond and CDS markets could result in 
mispricing on the bond markets and lead to higher funding costs for governments.56  
Essentially, when investors are concerned about a country’s financial stability, they 
will demand higher returns (i.e. higher yields) on government bonds to compensate 
for the higher level of risk and this will increase a country’s cost of borrowing.57 
Further, if the default probability on a bond increases, parties holding CDSs will 
profit from the increasing value of their position. 58  The common assertion of 
regulators and governments is that a rise in CDS prices will lead to a collapse in the 
underlying bond market prices, leading to higher funding costs for governments.59  
 
Consequently, during the crisis, regulators and governments became concerned about 
the incentives of CDS traders and that they could seek to speculate on a country’s 
default.60 Specifically, a letter from German Chancellor Merkel and French President 
Sarkozy to the Commission President in March 2010 demanded an inquiry into 
speculative practices in connection with CDS trading of government bonds. They 
stated that if such an inquiry demonstrated that there was a well founded suspicion 
that such speculative practices were having an impact on the development of bond 
yields, it should be examined whether such practices were suitable, and if necessary 
pass legislation.61  
 
With this in mind, the interaction between the two markets should be analysed and 
whether CDS prices are capable of manipulating bond prices. Specifically, for some, 
any evidence that CDS prices can sometimes lead price developments is then 
interpreted as indirectly demonstrating that CDS prices can manipulate bond prices 
and that restrictions should be introduced.62  
 
This section discusses the relevant economic literature that broadly suggests that the 
sovereign CDS market contributes to credit market price discovery but that the market 
is not perfectly ‘efficient’ or necessarily more price informative than the bond markets 
with respect to credit risk.63 Further, the findings that the CDS market sometimes 
                                                
56 Impact Assessment (n 21) 24. 
57 Investors will start selling bonds to reduce exposure to government debt, pushing interest rates 
higher. Further if bond yields are higher, the interest rate costs for the country will be much greater and 
the government will have to spend a large proportion of tax revenues on interest payments making it 
difficult to reduce government debt (and it will also be difficult for a government to raise new money 
as it has to pay an interest rate that is acceptable to the market). 
58 Economic and Monetary Affairs Policy Department: European Parliament, ‘Assessment of the 
Cumulative Impact of the Various Regulatory Initiatives on the European Banking Sector’ (Brussels, 
August 2011) 20. 
59 AIMA (n 9) 14. 
60 Economic and Monetary Affairs Policy Department: European Parliament (n 58) 20. 
61 Stephen Fidler, ‘What Sarkozy, Merkel Wrote on CDS’ The Wall Street Journal (11 March 2010). 
62 AIMA (n 9) 7; IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 15. Broadly, 
the argument is that if CDS market movements cause movements in the underlying bond markets, this 
provides easy manipulation opportunities. 
63  Houman Shadab, ‘Guilty by Association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps’ (2010) 4 
Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 407, 458; IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit 
Default Swaps (n 20) 24. 
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incorporates information faster than the bond market is not evidence that there is 
anything the matter with the CDS market, and should also not be used as indirect 
evidence that CDS prices are capable of manipulating bond prices, driving up the cost 
of government funding.64 Indeed the European Commission’s (the ‘Commission’) 
own Task Force that was set up to examine the effects of CDS trading during the 
sovereign debt crisis concluded that there was no conclusive evidence that 
developments in the sovereign CDS markets had caused higher funding costs for 
Member States.65  
 
1.3.2 Does One Market Lead the Other?  
Overview 
 
CDSs relate to the credit risk of an issuer: the risk of default of the issuer on its 
obligations towards its creditors. Equally, a bond purchaser is also exposed to various 
risks, including the credit risk that the issuer of the bond may not return the bond’s 
principal amount at maturity.66  More technically, economists explain the relationship 
as follows: if one takes the yield of a bond with a credit risk and subtracts the yield of 
a comparable bond that is free from credit risk, the credit risk spread component can 
be isolated.67  The credit spread of a bond of a particular sovereign and the CDS 
spread (or premium) for that sovereign should be closely linked as they both measure 
credit risk compensation for the sovereign (this is described as the ‘no arbitrage’ 
relationship).68 The academic literature suggests that in a perfect market without 
frictions, both markets should be equally efficient and should adjust simultaneously 
when there is new information on credit risk: price discovery should occur at the same 
time.69  
 
In practice however, due to various market imperfections,70 the difference between 
the CDS spread and the bond spread (the basis) tends not to be zero in the short run 
and can at times become sizeable.71 Such imperfections have led to researchers 
                                                
64  IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 15. Rather, what 
policymakers can legitimately worry about is manipulative shorting behaviour. 
65 Commission (n 11) 21-22. 
66 Impact Assessment (n 21) 14. 
67 BIS, ‘Intraday Dynamics of Euro Area Sovereign CDS and Bonds’ (n 1) 5-6. See also Darrell Duffie, 
‘Credit Swap Valuation’ (1999) 55 Financial Analysts Journal 73. Note that most papers compare CDS 
spreads to bond spreads rather than bond yields. Bonds spreads are the difference between the bond 
yield and the ‘interest rate swap’ (i.e. the risk-free rate), although some papers use German bonds as 
the risk-free measure. 
68 BIS, ‘Intraday Dynamics of Euro Area Sovereign CDS and Bonds’ (n 1) 5-6.  
69 Jorge A. Chan-Lau and Yoon Sook Kim, ‘Equity Prices, Credit Default Swaps, and Bond Spreads in 
Emerging Markets’ (IMF Working Paper, February 2004) 3-4. 
70 For instance there may be differences in the relative liquidity of the two markets (i.e. the number of 
participants in a given market); there may be costs attached to shorting bonds; tax effects; and other 
factors including counterparty risks. 
71 BIS, ‘Intraday Dynamics of Euro Area Sovereign CDS and Bonds’ 6. At some point however, 
arbitrage opportunities will become feasible enabling investors to profit from the non-zero basis, and it 
will tend to revert back to zero in the long run. 
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investigating, amongst other issues, which of the CDS and the bond market is the 
more informationally efficient (i.e. which market leads price movements and reflects 
credit risk more efficiently).72  There was already some existing consensus that the 
CDS market was more efficient than the bond market regarding price discovery for 
corporate reference entities.73 Such findings were in line with the greater liquidity of 
the corporate CDS market compared with the secondary corporate bond market 
(which is often illiquid), making it more straightforward to buy a CDS than to trade 
the bond.74 However the economic empirical findings have been much more mixed 
for sovereign entities.  
 
Appendix 2 to this paper summarises the main empirical work in this relatively young 
field of literature, and it is clear that the mixed findings in this area can, to an extent, 
be attributed to different methodological choices, including the use of different 
samples, time periods and data sources. 75  Nevertheless, overall the literature 
(including, crucially, the report of the Commission’s own Task Force) broadly 
illustrates that the changes in spreads in sovereign CDSs and bond markets are mainly 
contemporaneous and that each market is equally likely to lead the other.76  
 
Notably, some of the findings also illustrate the relevance of counterparty risk in 
impeding the role of CDSs in price discovery: a factor that is particularly relevant 
given the over-the-counter (‘OTC’) nature of the CDS market. Counterparty risk will 
have a negative effect on CDS prices: specifically the ability of the CDS market to 
lead the price discovery process will be impaired when levels of counterparty risk are 
high due to the perception of a lower quality of protection being sold.77 Consequently, 
proposals to push such sovereign CDSs into centralised clearing under related 
                                                
72 Patrick Augustin, ‘Sovereign Credit Default Swap Premia’ (14 January 2014, forthcoming, Journal 
of Investment Management) 21.  
73 See e.g. Roberto Blanco, Simon Brennan and Ian W. Marsh, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic 
Relation between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps’ (2005) 60 J Fin 2255; Haibin 
Zhu, ‘An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default 
Swap Market’ (2006) 29 Journal of Financial Services Research 211. This means the CDS market leads 
the bond market and is responsible for price movements. 
74 Coudert and Gex (n 35) 499. Indeed IOSCO reported that globally, net CDS exposure to private 
entities was four times higher than to sovereign entities at the end of 2011, see IOSCO (n 8) 7. IOSCO 
did observe however that although current research clearly showed that CDSs led the price discovery 
process for private issuers, it was not clear the extent this depended on the fact that CDSs were more 
liquid than bonds, or rather on the fact that short positions were easier to take in the CDS market. 
IOSCO also observed that these were not necessarily alternative explanations, see ibid 36-38.   
75 Augustin (n 72) 21; BIS, ‘Intraday Dynamics of Euro Area Sovereign CDS and Bonds’ (n 1) 4. For 
findings relating to emerging markets, see e.g. Chan-Lau and Kim (n 69); John Ammer and Fang Cai, 
‘Sovereign CDS and Bond Pricing Dynamics in Emerging Markets: Does the Cheapest-to-Deliver 
Option Matter?’ (2011) 21 Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 369. 
76 Commission (n 11) 21-26; Seretakis (n 7) 135. Seretakis also notes that in cases where price changes 
in the CDS market did lead changes in the underlying bond market, the changes in CDS spreads were 
linked to fundamentals responding to country-specific events, see ibid 135. 
77 Oscar Arce, Sergio Mayordomo and Juan Ignacio Peña, ‘Credit-Risk Valuation in the Sovereign 
CDS and Bonds Markets: Evidence from the Euro Area Crisis’ (2013) 35 Journal of International 
Money and Finance 124, 127; Ariel Levy, ‘The CDS Bond Basis Spread in Emerging Markets: 
Liquidity and Counterparty Risk Effects’ (Working Paper, April 2009) 35. Levy’s findings also 
suggested that changes in the relative liquidity in the two markets could explain why there was no 
consistent pattern of one market leading the other. See Appendix 2. 
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European legislative developments would help improve the role of sovereign CDSs in 
price formation by reducing counterparty credit risk.78 
1.3.3 Sovereign Debt Crisis: Main Empirical Findings  
Broadly, the literature suggests that the informational value of sovereign CDSs has 
become more important as the market has matured, but that the market is not perfectly 
‘efficient’ or necessarily more price informative than the bond markets with respect to 
credit risk.79 The sovereign CDS market sometimes leads the bond market, the bond 
market sometimes leads the CDS market, and that price discovery is equally likely to 
occur in either market.80  
 
Among the most directly relevant papers is the report of the Commission’s Task 
Force on Sovereign CDSs that was mandated to examine sovereign CDS activity 
during the sovereign debt crisis. The report found no evidence of obvious mispricing 
in either the CDS or the bond markets, and that CDS spreads for more troubled 
countries were cheap relative to the bond spreads implying that CDS spreads could 
hardly be considered to be causing the high bond yields in these countries.81 This was 
also consistent with a sufficient supply of insurance being offered to troubled 
countries and that speculators were acting as insurance providers at such times. This 
could be considered beneficial as it allowed institutional investors to take on more 
debt and keep the yields for such countries lower than otherwise would be possible.82 
Next, the spreads in the two markets were mainly contemporaneous and the vast 
majority of countries showed no lead or lag behaviour. When not changing 
contemporaneously, either the CDS or bond market was equally likely to lead or lag 
the other and the report concluded that price discovery was equally likely to occur on 
the CDS or bond markets.83   
 
Likewise, a 2013 paper by Arce et al. suggested that although CDS markets led price 
discovery in most euro areas in normal times, during periods of acute stress in the 
Eurozone, the bond market led the price discovery process. The authors also re-
emphasised the importance of levels of counterparty risk in explaining some of the 
variation in the price discovery process. In particular, they observed that increased 
levels of counterparty risk impaired the ability of the CDS market to lead the price 
discovery process due to the perception of a lower quality of protection being sold.84 
                                                
78 See below at section 1.3.3 for problems with this proposal however. 
79 Shadab (n 63) 458; IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 10; 
Augustin (n 72) 24.  
80 There may be good reasons why there are particular periods when one market leads the other, 
including which market has the higher liquidity on a given day, see Commission (n 11) 16; IOSCO (n 
8) 36. 
81 Commission (n 11) 21-22. 
82 Ibid 22. 
83 Ibid 25. See also Alessandro Fontana and Martin Scheicher, ‘An Analysis of Euro Area Sovereign 
CDS and Their Relation with Government Bonds’ (ECB Working Paper, December 2010); Dominic 
O'Kane, ‘The Link between Eurozone Sovereign Debt and CDS Prices’ (Bankers, Markets & Investors, 
March-April 2012) (both detailed in Appendix 2) for similar findings. 
84 Arce, Mayordomo and Peña (n 77) 127. See further details in Appendix 2. See also Manthos D. Delis 
and Nikolaos Mylonidis, ‘The Chicken or the Egg? A Note on the Dynamic Interrelation between 
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Finally, research conducted by the IMF observed that sovereign CDSs tended to 
reveal information quicker during times of stress but not at other times, and that the 
informational value of CDSs had become more important but varied widely over 
countries and over time.85  Notably, the IMF concluded that overall the evidence did 
not support the need to ban purchases of naked CDS protection.86 
 
The findings that the CDS markets sometimes incorporate information faster than 
bond markets does not provide evidence that there is anything wrong with the CDS 
market and should also not be used as indirect evidence that CDS prices are capable 
of manipulating bond prices, driving up the cost of government funding.87 Indeed, a 
qualitative paper by Duffie observed that in the case of financially weaker European 
sovereigns, as the aggregate net CDSs represented such an insufficient portion of the 
total debt outstanding, CDSs would not be able to manipulate and affect the 
underlying debt.88  
 
Duffie noted that setting aside the fact that it was very difficult to profit from 
manipulation, achieving a sizeable price impact (through aggressive purchases of 
naked CDSs) would require manipulators to take positions that were large relative to 
the underlying debt.89 The author specifically analysed the case of Greece and 
observed that the aggregate of net CDS positions for Greece had remained well under 
three per cent of the total amount of Greek debt outstanding between October 2008 
and July 2010.90 He concluded that even if all the holders of CDSs on Greece were 
pure speculators, this would only have had a minor effect on bondholders.91  
 
                                                                                                                                       
Government Bond Spreads and Credit Default Swaps’ (2011) 8 Finance Research Letters 163 (detailed 
in Appendix 2) that found that CDSs lost their leading role in the price discovery process during 
stressful conditions. See BIS, ‘Intraday Dynamics of Euro Area Sovereign CDS and Bonds’ (n 1);  and 
Giorgia Palladini and Richard Portes, ‘Sovereign CDS and Bond Pricing Dynamics in the Euro-Area’ 
(NBER Working Paper, November 2011) (both detailed in Appendix 2) for findings that the CDS 
market leads the bond market for most countries in terms of price discovery. 
85 IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 10. 
86 Ibid 1; See also IMF, Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer System (April 2010) 
46-48 where the IMF cautioned against a ban on naked sovereign CDSs.  
87 IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 15. 
88 Duffie, ‘Is There a Case for Banning Short Speculation in Sovereign Bond Markets?’ (n 18) 57; 
Marmol (n 26) 59. 
89 Duffie, ‘Is There a Case for Banning Short Speculation in Sovereign Bond Markets?’ (n 18) 57. He 
also observed that manipulation through spreading false information would also be difficult to achieve, 
see ibid 57-8. 
90 Ibid 57. He further observed that in every week since the DTCC had started reporting market-wide 
CDS positions, the increase in aggregate protection bought against Greek sovereign debt was less than 
0.18 per cent of the total Greek sovereign debt outstanding. For further details on Greece during the 
sovereign debt crisis, see Appendix 3. 
91 See also René M. Stulz, ‘Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis’ (2010) 24 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 73, 83 who, in the context of the financial crisis argued that CDS trading did not of itself 
lead to an acceleration of the turbulence leading to the default of Lehman Brothers. Likewise, see 
Shadab (n 63) 458 who noted that concerns about market manipulation should be carefully balanced 
against the role played by CDSs in contributing to credit market price discovery. 
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Ultimately, the literature broadly demonstrates that the sovereign CDS market 
contributes to credit market price discovery,92 but that there is no strong evidence 
conclusively linking sovereign CDS trading with instability in the bond markets.93 
Indeed in line with Duffie’s paper, given the tiny size of the sovereign CDS markets 
compared with the underlying bond markets, manipulation of the latter by the former 
would be very difficult to achieve.94  
 
Further, on a related point to these findings, given that counterparty risk can clearly 
impede the ability of the CDS market to lead the price discovery process, moving 
sovereign CDSs through centralised clearing would reduce counterparty risk and help 
improve the contribution of sovereign CDSs to price discovery.95 However it is also 
recognised in this regard that is trickier to centrally clear sovereign CDSs than other 
derivatives. Specifically central counterparties (‘CCPs’) are reluctant to clear 
sovereign CDSs due to concerns about ‘wrong-way’ risks. Clearing participants are 
required to post collateral to cover losses, and as this would be in the same currency 
as that underlying the sovereign CDS contract, the distress of a sovereign could lead 
to a vicious cycle that would impair the value of the collateral while increasing the 
risk in the CDS contract.96 Aside from this concern and on a more practical point, 
sovereigns are also likely to be out of scope of the centralised clearing requirements 
introduced in the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (‘EMIR’).97 
 
1.4 Banning Naked Sovereign CDSs? 
 
In March and April 2010 the German regulator BaFin, and the Chair of CESR, 
commented that there was no evidence of CDSs being used to speculate on 
government bonds.98 Despite this, both Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy 
started to raise concerns as to the possible role played by CDSs in relation to the price 
of Greek government bonds. Subsequently, in May 2010, concerns that naked 
                                                
92 Shadab (n 63) 458. 
93 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press, 2014) 542; IOSCO (n 8) 1, 38.  
94 Impact Assessment (n 21) 25. Further even if one believed that price discovery in the sovereign CDS 
market was in fact indirect evidence in favour of price speculation driving up public borrowing costs, 
the ambiguous empirical results should caution against making any drastic regulatory changes that 
could negatively effect the ‘efficient information transmission in financial markets’, Augustin (n 72) 
29-30.  
95 Central clearing would enforce strong risk management standards, multilateral netting of positions 
and sharing of extreme losses, IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 
17. 
96 Ibid 17-8. 
97 ISDA, Overview of US and EU OTC Derivatives Regulatory Reforms (2014) 7. 
98 In April 2010, CESR Chair Eddy Wymeersch was quoted as saying that CESR had not seen clear 
signs of any speculation or abuse in these markets. See e.g. AFME, ISLA and ISDA, AFME, ISLA and 
ISDA Joint Response to the European Commission’s Public Consultation on Short Selling (9 July 
2010) 13.  Equally the German regulator BaFin came to a similar conclusion in March 2010. It clarified 
that based on its monitoring of the markets for government bonds and CDSs of selected countries 
within the euro-area, it had not found any evidence of CDSs being used to speculate against Greek 
government bonds, see BaFin Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, ‘BaFin Clarifies: So Far No 
Evidence of Massive Speculation against Greek Bonds’ BaFin News Release (8 March 2010). 
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sovereign CDSs were being used to ‘gamble’ on the health of sovereigns led to BaFin 
introducing a ban on naked sovereign CDSs on euro-area government bonds.99 BaFin 
justified the ban on the basis of exceptional volatility in euro-area bonds and the 
danger that excessive price shifts could trigger significant disadvantages for financial 
markets and threaten the stability of the entire financial system.100 Nevertheless, given 
the unilateral nature of the act, it was likely to have been politically driven, especially 
caused by pressure on Chancellor Merkel within her own political party in relation to 
the German response to the Greek debt crisis. Indeed the feeling that Germany had 
also acted to improve its own finances was compounded by its ability to 
simultaneously issue new debt at the cheapest rate since 1998 aided by the short 
squeeze created by the ban.101   
 
1.4.1 Impact of the German Ban 
A 2012 paper by Pu and Zhang specifically analysed the global impact of the German 
ban on the sovereign CDS market, and examined five-year sovereign CDS spreads 
over the period October 12 2000 to April 5 2011.102 The authors considered the time 
trend of CDS spreads, volatility, liquidity, and macroeconomic conditions across 
fifty-four countries, including the ‘PIIGS’ countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
and Spain).103  In line with the majority of the wider short selling literature that 
analysed the impact of short selling bans during the financial crisis, the authors found 
that CDS spreads continued to rise after the ban in the debt crisis region and that 
market liquidity was also impaired for the PIIGS countries.104 However, in contrast to 
the effect of short sale bans on the equity markets, the authors did observe that the ban 
helped reduce CDS volatility.105 The authors also observed that sovereign CDS 
spreads were closely related to a country’s macroeconomic conditions: for instance 
the PIIGS countries, whose CDS spreads had increased considerably since early 2010, 
                                                
99 The ban also covered naked short sales on sovereign debt, and naked short sales of shares in 
particular banks and insurers. See Alan Crawford, ‘Germany to Temporarily Ban Naked Short Selling, 
Some Swaps of Euro Bonds’ Bloomberg (18 May 2010). 
100 Stacy-Marie Ishmael, ‘BaFin Statement on Germany’s Naked Short Selling Ban’ FT Alphaville (18 
May 2010). Germany subsequently made the ban permanent in July 2010. 
101 Harry Wilson, ‘Markets Crash as German Short--Selling Ban Bites’ The Telegraph (19 May 2010). 
Indeed it is likely that such a ban created more of a preference for ‘safe’ German bonds (a ‘flight to 
safety’), meaning lower funding costs for Germany compared with other countries. 
102 Xiaoling Pu and Jianing Zhang, ‘Sovereign CDS Spreads, Volatility, and Liquidity: Evidence from 
2010 German Short Sale Ban’ (2012) 47 Financial Review 171, 176-7.  
103 Ibid 172-176. The sample included the PIIGS countries, seven other Eurozone countries, fifteen 
non-Eurozone European countries, nine Asian countries, seven Middle-Eastern countries, eight South 
American countries, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. 
104 Ibid 173. The majority of the short selling literature reported that short selling bans usually lead to 
an increase in bid-ask spreads for banned stocks, see e.g. Ekkehart Boehmer, Charles M. Jones and 
Xiaoyan Zhang, ‘Shackling Short Sellers: The 2008 Shorting Ban’ (2013) 26 Rev Fin Stud 1363; 
Matthew Clifton and Mark Snape, ‘The Effect of Short-Selling Restrictions on Liquidity: Evidence 
from the London Stock Exchange’ (2008). 
105 Pu and Zhang (n 102) 172-3. The authors noted that this could be due to shrinking speculation 
activities after the ban. Due to the ban, investors could be cautious as to using CDSs to express their 
view on the sovereign credit risk and might be forced to unwind their position. 
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had slower economic growth, lower reserves, and higher debt in gross domestic 
product (‘GDP’).106  
 
Overall the authors’ findings demonstrated that where a sovereign entity could not 
improve its economic condition, banning speculation on naked CDSs or short bond 
positions was not capable of ‘suppressing the rampantly rising sovereign yields’.107 
 
1.4.2 Impact of a Permanent Prohibition? 
With this in mind, before turning to examine the provisions now introduced by the 
Regulation, it is also helpful to reflect on the possible implications of a permanent 
prohibition on naked sovereign CDSs. First, it is likely that a permanent prohibition 
would destroy the market.108 For instance, if the CDS market consisted of only 
hedgers, these market participants would not find counterparties, as the market would 
have no liquidity.109  Indeed, the presence in the market of those who previously 
purchased naked sovereign CDSs and were then able to take the other side and sell 
protection could also help mitigate volatility during crisis times.110 Hence, the absence 
of such market participants could in fact lead to less rather than more stability.111 
Further, in a 2010 paper, Stulz observed that there was no evidence that removing 
naked purchases of CDSs would help the economy, ‘any more than attempts to reduce 
stock short-sales did during the crisis’.112   
 
A 2010 paper by Duffie reiterated these points, noting that regulations restricting 
speculation in the credit default swap markets could have the unintended consequence 
of reducing market liquidity and this would raise trading execution costs for other 
investors who were not speculating.113 Indeed, in line with Pu and Zhang’s findings, 
imposing restrictions could in fact have the opposite effect to that which is intended 
and increase the borrowing costs for sovereign issuers.114  Equally, by making the 
hedging of sovereign debt more challenging, this could also discourage the purchase 
of sovereign debt, which could also have knock on effects for interest rates and public 
deficits.115 Further, by attempting to ban traders with negative information or beliefs, 
                                                
106 Ibid 173.  
107 Ibid 172.  
108 Stulz (n 91) 85. 
109 Ibid 85. 
110 AIMA (n 9) 15. 
111 Ibid 15. 
112 Stulz (n 91) 85. 
113 Duffie, ‘Is There a Case for Banning Short Speculation in Sovereign Bond Markets?’ (n 18) 58. He 
also noted that it would lower the quality of information provided by CDS rates regarding the credit 
quality of bond issuers. 
114 Ibid 58. For instance a ban on CDSs could actually add to the pressure on government bonds leading 
to increased bond selling, making it more expensive for governments to borrow or service their debt. 
See BBA, European Consultation on Short Selling: A Response by the British Bankers’ Association 
(July 2010) 13. 
115 AFME, ISLA and ISDA (n 98) 20. 
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economic problems could also be delayed by ‘closing the collective eyes of the 
market’.116  
 
Next, introducing a prohibition on naked sovereign CDSs would likely be ineffective. 
For instance, as will be discussed further in section 1.5 below, as there are substitute 
strategies that can be used, such a ban (particularly in the absence of supranational 
coverage) may only encourage market participants to engage in regulatory arbitrage 
and move their positions into other assets correlated with sovereign risk that could 
also involve less transparent instruments, or to offshore jurisdictions.117 Indeed, 
spillover into over markets could come with the unintended consequence of reducing 
financial stability.118 With this in mind, if the intention of the regulators is to simply 
discourage all and any speculation against a sovereign issuer, then the net should in 
fact be cast much further than naked sovereign CDSs to also encompass all such 
instruments that allow taking positions on the credit risk of an issuer that benefit from 
the worsening of credit risk of a country.119  
 
Ultimately it is clear that a ban on naked CDSs will not prevent markets reacting to 
adverse information, and in the case of sovereigns it would seem far more prudent to 
focus on tackling the underlying fiscal problems of a country rather than seeking to 
ban the symptoms of the problem.120 
1.4.3 Burning Down Your Neighbour’s House?  
It is also relevant here to observe an analogy that particularly surfaced in the media 
during the sovereign debt crisis. This suggested that the purchase of a naked sovereign 
CDS was akin to buying insurance on your neighbour’s house.121 It was argued that 
just as such a situation would give a policyholder an incentive to then burn down their 
neighbour’s house, equally a purchaser of a naked sovereign CDS would prefer to 
then see the borrower default. This can also be described as creating a risk of ‘moral 
hazard’. For instance if a market participant purchased a sovereign CDS without 
having a proportionate insurable interest in the underlying debt obligation or exposure 
to the underlying credit risk, the holder of the CDS could have a perverse incentive to 
precipitate a default and obtain the pay-out from the CDS.122  
 
                                                
116 David Mason, ‘The Senator Has No Clothes: Why a Ban on “Naked” Credit Default Swaps Is Ill-
Advised and Impractical’ (The Heritage Foundation, May 2010) 2. 
117 AIMA (n 9) 13. Indeed the Commission observed that a ban could easily be circumvented by 
investors trading CDSs in non-EU countries and that there was very little the EU regulators could do 
about this. See Impact Assessment (n 21) 47; Oskari Juurikkala, ‘Credit Default Swaps and the EU 
Short Selling Regulation: A Critical Analysis’ (2012) 9 ECFR 307, 340. 
118 IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 21. 
119 Italian Treasury, EC Public Consultation on Short Selling (9 July 2010) 3-4. This would include for 
instance futures and options. 
120 Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Bank Research: Credit Default Swaps (December 2009) 23; AIMA (n 9) 
13. 
121 See e.g. Wolfgang Münchau, ‘Time to Outlaw Naked Credit Default Swaps’ Financial Times (1 
March 2010). 
122 Impact Assessment (n 21) 25. 
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Nevertheless, this analogy starts to breaks down when one bears in mind that the 
buyer of the naked sovereign CDS is unlikely to be able to increase the chance, or in 
fact trigger, a borrower defaulting. This is particularly the case given that, as already 
observed, the sovereign CDS market only represents a tiny fraction of the underlying 
bond market.123  Indeed as Duffie observed, Greece had already borrowed far more 
than it could pay back before CDS rates rose significantly.124 Further, a greater moral 
hazard could also potentially arise if a CDS protection buyer was a lender who was 
hedging its large loan to a sovereign borrower using a sovereign CDS. Such a lender 
may no longer be as interested in monitoring the borrower’s credit quality and could 
in fact have more of an incentive than a purchaser of a naked CDS to force the 
borrower to default: the ‘empty creditor’ problem.125 
 
1.4.4 Legal Recharacterisation as an Insurance Contract? 
 
Separately, the relationship between naked CDSs and contracts of insurance should 
also be considered. Specifically it is clear that the economic effect of a naked CDS is 
similar to the effect of an insurance contract against the risk of default without an 
insurable interest. Consequently if such a CDS contract were to be also legally 
characterised as an insurance contract it would be void whereas if termed as a CDS 
(in the absence of a ban) it would be valid.126  
 
This question of whether credit derivatives might be legally recharacterised as 
insurance contracts was widely debated in the 1990s and Robin Potts QC was 
instructed on behalf of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (‘ISDA’) 
to provide an opinion with respect to these concerns. Broadly, he advised that 
although insurance contracts and credit derivatives were functionally similar, credit 
derivatives were legally distinct as the payment obligation was not conditional on the 
payee’s loss and there was no requirement for an insurable interest.127 With this in 
mind he concluded that for regulatory purposes, entering them could not be 
characterised as insurance business.128 The Potts Opinion was relied on by the whole 
industry as conclusive,129 and it was subsequently observed that due to the huge 
growth of the credit derivatives market the point of no return had long passed: the 
                                                
123 Duffie, ‘Is There a Case for Banning Short Speculation in Sovereign Bond Markets?’ (n 18) 58.  
124 Ibid 58.   
125 Ibid 58. See further Henry Hu and Bernard Black, ‘Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting 
II: Importance and Extensions’ (2008) 158 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 625. However it is 
also acknowledged that as assessment of sovereign creditworthiness largely rests on public information 
this may not be of such relevance as for corporate entities. 
126 Hence, the legal treatment will differ depending on the parties’ legal characterisation of the contract. 
127 Benjamin (n 10) paras 5.140-5.142. 
128 This also had significance as, if they were so characterised as insurance, financial institutions would 
require to be authorised to carry out insurance business and would not be authorised to carry out other 
non-insurance business, Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne, Corporate Finance Law: Principles and 
Policy (Hart 2011) 204-5.   
129 Ibid 205. The view has been questioned however, see e.g. Marcus Smith, ‘The Legal Nature of 
Credit Default Swaps’ [2010] Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 386 who observed that 
the two differences identified by Potts QC did not prevent a CDS being a contract of insurance. 
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consequences of a recharacterisation would be too far-reaching to be contemplated.130  
Further the correctness of the Potts Opinion was also subsequently assumed in 
European legislation where CDSs have been regulated as derivative rather than as 
insurance contracts.131  
 
More generally however it should also be noted that the fact CDSs resemble insurance 
is not sufficient to merit regulating them as such. First, many contracts contain an 
element of risk sharing or insurance but are not regulated as insurance contracts.132 
Next, the reason insurance regulation does not extend to all such contracts is due to 
the precise purpose of insurance regulation. 133  In particular, one of the main 
justifications for a separate insurance law relates to concerns about unsophisticated 
consumers who need protection from entering contracts they do not understand, and 
such an argument does not extend to CDSs where the average market participant is 
sophisticated and capable of bearing losses.134 Finally, even if one sought to regulate 
CDSs that look like insurance, there would be considerable difficulty in accurately 
drawing the dividing lines and parties could simply contract round the lines and enter 
equivalent ‘synthetic’ and unregulated transactions that had the same economic 
effect.135 Indeed, as will be observed below, this issue of regulatory arbitrage is now 
also of particular relevance with the new European rules. 
 
1.4.5 Legal Recharacterisation as a Gaming Contract? 
A related issue in this context is whether CDS contracts could be recharacterised as 
‘gaming’ or ‘wagering’ contract as such contracts were historically unenforceable.136 
It is unlikely however that naked CDSs could be so classified. First, English case law 
has held that speculation must be the sole purpose of both parties to the contracts for 
the term to apply.137 With this in mind it would be very difficult to show that both 
parties to a CDS contract were intending purely to gamble. For instance many CDS 
purchasers would be using the contract as a hedge, whereas the sellers would be 
seeking to provide a service for a price to make a profit.138 Further and more 
                                                
130 Benjamin (n 10) 5.143.  
131 See e.g. Council Regulation (EU) 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
March 2012 on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps [2012] OJ L86/1, art 
2(1)(c). Note however that the Regulation’s recitals provide that sovereign CDSs should be based on 
the insurable interest principle although it has been suggested that the choice of words reflects a policy 
intention rather than seeking to re-introduce questions about regulating CDSs as insurance contracts, 
see Slaughter and May, The European Regulation on Short Selling and CDS (July 2012) 4. 
132 M. Todd Henderson, ‘Credit Derivatives Are Not "Insurance"’ (2009) 16 Conn Ins LJ 1, 4-5. 
Henderson provides the example of a farmer who enters into a contract to allow him to sell his crop at a 
fixed price in the future (a ‘forward’ contract) and is insuring against an increase in the price of wheat 
yet this is not regulated as an insurance contract. 
133 Ibid 4-6. 
134 Gullifer and Payne (n 128) 208. 
135 Henderson (n 132) 33; Gullifer and Payne (n 128) 208. 
136 Benjamin (n 10) section 5.136. See for instance, section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845. If this were the 
case, there would be no naked CDSs although there would still be short selling. 
137 See Hawkins J in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1892] 2 QB 489, 491.  
138 Smith (n 129) 406. 
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practically, this is no longer an open question as the Gambling Act 2005 now provides 
that ‘the fact that a contract relates to gambling shall not prevent its enforcement’.139 
 
1.5 EU Regulation: A Ban on Naked Sovereign CDSs  
 
1.5.1 Articles 4 and 14 
Turning to then consider the precise rules introduced by the Regulation, the final rules 
are complex, reflecting the Parliament’s desire to prohibit naked sovereign CDS 
activity, whilst also seeking to try and enable legitimate hedging behaviour. Article 14 
provides that a person may enter into sovereign CDS transactions only where the 
transaction does not lead to an uncovered position in a sovereign CDS as referred to 
in article 4.140 Article 4 then provides for two types of permitted hedging. First, 
hedging is permitted where the sovereign CDS serves to hedge against the risk of 
default of the issuer where the person has a long position in the sovereign debt of that 
issuer to which the sovereign CDS relates.141 Secondly, proxy hedging is permitted 
where the sovereign CDS serves to hedge against the risk of the decline of the value 
of the sovereign debt where the person holds assets or is subject to liabilities, 
including but not limited to financial contracts, a portfolio of assets, or financial 
obligations, the value of which is correlated to the value of the sovereign debt.142  
 
Proxy hedging is crucial to hedging and risk management in the CDS market; 
however in many cases it can be difficult to clearly distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate hedging activities.143 Consequently, as will be considered in section 1.5.2 
below, the related technical rules introduce a complex set of requirements that are 
tricky for market participants to meet with complete certainty in practice. 
 
1.5.2 Delegated Regulation 918/2012: Conditions 
1.5.2.1 Geographical Scope 
 
First, although a wide range of exposures can be hedged,144 the use of sovereign CDS 
to hedge cross-border risks is not generally permissible. ESMA stated that it was the 
                                                
139 Section 335(1); Benjamin (n 10) 5.144. 
140 Regulation 236/2012, art 14(1). The article 14 restrictions do not apply to market makers however, 
art 17(1). Further, to exclude retroactive effect, transactions resulting in an uncovered position in a 
sovereign CDS that were concluded before 25 March 2012 may be held to the maturity date of the CDS 
contract, see art 46(2). 
141 Ibid art 4(1)(a). 
142 Ibid art 4(1)(b). 
143 Moloney (n 93) 542; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 918/2012 supplementing Regulation 
No 236/2012 on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps with Regard to Definitions, 
the Calculation of Net Short Positions, Covered Sovereign Credit Default Swaps, Notification 
Thresholds, Liquidity Thresholds for Suspending Restrictions, Significant Falls in the Value of 
Financial Instruments and Adverse Events [2012] OJ 274/1, recital 6. 
144 See ibid art 17. 
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intention of the co-legislators that the geographical scope of the rules should not be 
drawn too broadly,145 and there are only very limited exceptions to this (provided the 
correlation test is also met).146  
 
The geographical requirements are problematic; particularly as such constraints could 
limit responsible risk management. Specifically, there may be several legitimate 
reasons for hedging a risk in one Member State with a sovereign CDS related to a 
reference entity in another Member State.147  For instance, a market participant may 
have sovereign debt exposure to Germany but want to buy sovereign CDS protection 
on Denmark, as the Danish sovereign CDS is highly correlated but also is a cheaper 
proxy for German debt.148  
 
Further, it is also likely that such geographical restrictions could contradict core 
principles of the EU’s single market: for instance even if a market participant meets 
the correlation test, they could still be prohibited from trading in a particular 
sovereign CDS simply because the instruments were issued in a different Member 
State.149 This sits uncomfortably with the vision of a single European financial market 
and could in fact provide a disincentive in relation to cross-border business. For 
instance it could encourage companies to conduct business in their home Member 
State because counterparties would be better able to hedge their exposures to entities 
in their home Member State.150  
 
Likewise, despite ESMA observing that it was the co-legislators’ intention that the 
geographical scope of the rules should not be drawn too widely, when one considers 
the wording of the Regulation itself, it does not explicitly state that hedging can only 
be within one Member State.151  Article 4 is silent on this issue, and recital 21 states 
that such interests ‘include’ hedging against the risk of default of a sovereign issuer. 
Recital 21 then provides examples of a wide range of exposures that could be eligible 
for hedging and although the recital does refer to hedging exposure ‘in the Member 
State concerned’ this is arguably also an example rather than a requirement that 
hedging can only be within one Member state.152 
                                                
145 ESMA, ‘Technical Advice on Possible Delegated Acts Concerning the Regulation on Short Selling 
and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps ((EC) No 236/2012) Final Report ESMA 2012/263’ 
(April 2012) 39. 
146 For instance where the sovereign CDS references the sovereign Member State of a parent company 
that gives credit support to a subsidiary in another Member State, a sovereign CDS position will not be 
considered uncovered where it is to hedge exposure to the subsidiary, Delegated Regulation 918/2012 
art 15(1)(a). 
147 AFME and ISDA, ESMA Call for Evidence (15 March 2013) 37.  
148 ‘Short Selling and CDS Regulation in EU: Less to Nakedness Than Meets the Eye, Funds and Firms 
Argue’ Reuters (5 March 2012). 
149 AFME and ISDA (n 147) 37. 
150 Ibid 37. 
151 Managed Funds Association, Response to Consultation on Draft Technical Standards on Possible 
Delegated Acts (March 2012) 11-12. 
152 Ibid 12. Indeed, when the Delegated Regulation was being drafted there were considerable 
differences of view as to whether cross-border hedging was permissible. For instance a member of 
ESMA’s board of supervisors was quoted as saying that although it was not entirely clear from the 
wording of the Regulation whether cross-border hedging was exempt or not, ESMA had received a 
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1.5.2.2 Proportionality 
 
Next, there is a broad proportionality requirement: the size of the sovereign CDS 
position must be proportionate to the size of the exposure that is being hedged. As 
matching assets and liabilities to create a perfect hedge is difficult in practice due to 
the diverse characteristics of different assets and liabilities, as well as the volatility in 
their values, an exact match is not required under the rules.153 If the exposure being 
hedged is liquidated or redeemed however, it must either be replaced by equivalent 
exposures, or the CDS position must be reduced or otherwise disposed of.154  
 
The proportionality requirement reflects ESMA’s technical advice and has the benefit 
of avoiding overly narrow rules.155 However, on a more practical note, the position 
holder cannot be hedged only when the transaction is entered into, the position holder 
must maintain a continuously hedged position proportionate to the size of the 
exposure.156 
 
1.5.2.3 Correlation 
 
Finally, correlation is a key test to eligibility. The test is one of ‘simple correlation’157 
and the Delegated Regulation sets out alternative quantitative or qualitative 
correlation tests.158 ESMA’s earlier technical advice proposed a purely qualitative 
                                                                                                                                       
‘very strong position’ from the Commission’s legal services that it was not exempt, see e.g. ‘Short 
Selling and CDS Regulation in EU: Less to Nakedness Than Meets the Eye, Funds and Firms Argue’ 
(n 148) 2. 
153 Delegated Regulation 918/2012 art 19(1). Limited over-provision is permitted in accordance with 
article 19(2). 
154 Ibid art 19(3). Article 20 also provides for the method of calculation of an uncovered CDS position. 
The calculation of a person’s position shall be of the net sovereign CDS position (i.e. any sales of the 
relevant sovereign CDS shall be deducted from the purchased CDS). When calculating the value of 
eligible assets or liabilities hedged or to be hedged by the CDS, a distinction is also made between 
static and dynamic hedging strategies (for further details, see Appendix 1). The value of the eligible 
portfolio of assets or liabilities is then deducted from the value of the net CDS position and if the 
resulting number is positive (i.e. the CDS position exceeds the value of the portfolio of exposures to be 
hedged), the position shall be considered uncovered. See further ESMA (n 145) 43-44; Credit Suisse, 
‘The Regulation on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of CDS’ (Fixed Income Research, October 
2012), Appendix. 
155 Juurikkala (n 117) 330. 
156 Sidley Austin LLP, EU Short Selling and CDS Regulation – Analysis of “Level 2” Measures (2012) 
5. 
157 ESMA (n 145) 39. Note that this contrasts with the degree of correlation prescribed in relation to 
calculating net short positions in sovereign debt, where the Regulation refers to a test of ‘high 
correlation’, see Regulation 236/2012, art 3(5). Likewise, the Regulation’s restrictions on uncovered 
short sales in sovereign debt do not apply if the transaction serves to hedge a long position in debt 
instruments on an issuer, the pricing of which has a ‘high correlation’ with the pricing of the sovereign 
debt see ibid art 13(2). 
158 Delegated Regulation 918/2012, art 18(1). Some self-evident cases where the correlation test is 
deemed to have been met are set out in ibid, art 18(2) such as where the exposure being hedged relates 
to an enterprise which is owned by the sovereign issuer. 
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approach however the Commission chose to include both tests, observing that this 
was in line with the only EU precedent: the unilateral German ban.159  
 
The quantitative correlation test is met by showing a ‘Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient’ of at least 70 per cent between the price of the assets or liabilities and the 
price of the sovereign debt calculated on a historical basis using data for at least a 
period of twelve months of trading days immediately preceding the date the sovereign 
CDS position was taken out.160 Although this test benefits from being precise and 
objective,161 the requirement that it be calculated on a historical basis fails to take into 
account the fact that past correlation may change over time or may not yet exist in 
relation to situations of legitimate hedging of future risks.162  
 
Next, the qualitative correlation test provides that the test shall be met by showing 
‘meaningful’ correlation: this is a correlation based on ‘appropriate’ data and is not 
evidence of a ‘merely temporary dependence’.163  However, it is unclear what will be 
sufficient to satisfy this test. Although it has likely been included so that market 
participants can capture a broader range of correlated assets, relying on this 
qualitative limb could be risky in practice.164 For instance, where a market participant 
is called on to justify that the qualitative test has been met, a party could breach the 
prohibition if they cannot then demonstrate to the regulator that the data relied on was 
appropriate.165 Indeed, due to the uncertainties as to whether either correlation test 
will be satisfied, sovereign CDSs may not be used to hedge exposures and this will 
lead to a shift to other instruments.166  
 
These concerns have been borne out in practice. Specifically, from August 2011 
onwards, volumes of net notional European CDSs started to sharply decline, and this 
could have been in part due to short positions being unwound in advance of the 
                                                
159 ESMA (n 145) 39; European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for 
Delegated Regulation 918/2012 SWD(2012) 198, 28. 
160 Delegated Regulation 918/2012, art 18(1)(a). For further details on Pearson’s correlation coefficient, 
see Appendix 1. 
161 Delegated Regulation Impact Assessment (n 159) 27. 
162 AFME and ISDA (n 147) 36. For example in general it will not be possible to use sovereign CDSs 
to hedge ‘tail risk’ events, see further Appendix 1. See also Managed Funds Association (n 151) 15. 
Further, the adoption of a historic test is linked to an assumption that the past is the only guide to the 
future and in other areas of financial markets this is held to be unreliable (for instance, the phrase ‘past 
performance is not a guide to future performance’ is often used in the context of providing financial 
services to retail clients).  
163 Delegated Regulation 918/2012 art 18(1)(b). The time frame for the calculation is set out (broadly 
using the historical basis of the previous twelve months but an alternative time frame can be used).   
164 Credit Suisse (n 154) 8. 
165 Travers Smith, Short Selling: Remember, Remember the First of November (26 October 2012) 3. 
Separately however it should also be observed that the Regulation does not specify penalties for 
infringement and only requires that these be established by the Member States. This means penalties 
may vary widely between countries and that the rules could ultimately be an ineffective deterrent. See 
Regulation 236/2012, art 41; Juurikkala (n 117) 340. 
166 AFME and ISDA (n 147) 11. 
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Regulation’s introduction.167 In fact, some market participants indicated that positions 
were being unwound as it was feared that the hedging rules were ‘so vague’ that they 
could be viewed as speculating even if they were not.168  Market participants also 
observed anecdotally that Asian participation in the European bond markets had fallen 
to under fifty per cent since the Regulation’s introduction, suggesting that the 
restrictions could be driving investors away.169  
 
Further, there has also been a sharp decline in the volumes traded on the European 
sovereign CDS indices, resulting in significantly reduced liquidity. Broadly speaking, 
CDS contracts on a basket of reference entities are known as ‘so called index and 
tranche’ CDSs.170 Such indices compromise of many reference entities with a theme 
in common (e.g. European sovereigns). The index is composed of the fifteen 
constituents with the largest sum of weekly trading activity and entities are weighted 
equally in the index.171 Every six months, a new ‘series’ of the index is introduced, 
updating the set of constituents in the index. Since the Regulation came into force 
volumes traded on the main European sovereign CDS index, the Markit iTraxx SovX 
Western Europe Index (the ‘SovX’ index), have declined one hundred per cent (i.e. it 
has essentially been shut-down).172 Markit, (the index provider) also announced that 
until further notice, no new series of the index would be published.173 This has also 
resulted in the creation of a new sub-index for SovX known as ‘ex-EU’: constituents 
that do not form part of the European Economic Area.174 Again, this only serves to 
further demonstrate that the Regulation’s constraints have negatively impacted the use 
of sovereign CDS indices, including for responsible risk management.175   
 
1.5.2.4 Opt-Out 
 
Turning then to the ability to temporarily suspend the restrictions, the Parliament was 
forced to concede to this possibility during the Regulation’s negotiations, and the 
                                                
167 ESMA, ‘Technical Advice on the Evaluation of Regulation (EU) 236/2012 on Short Selling and 
Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps’ (June 2013) 90; IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign 
Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 17. The IMF noted that Italy was the exception to this and that this could 
be due to Italy having substantial uncollateralised positions with a number of banks that were using 
sovereign CDSs to hedge the counterparty risk on these contracts. 
168 IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 17. 
169 AFME and ISDA (n 147) 11. 
170 IOSCO (n 8) 12. 
171 Markit, ‘Markit iTraxx Sovx: A Global Sovereign CDS Index Family’ (September 2014) 3-4. 
172 Deutsche Bank, ESMA Call for Evidence (15 March 2013) 9.  
173 Markit (n 171) 4. 
174 Deutsche Bank, ESMA Call for Evidence (n 172) 9. 
175 ESMA (n 167) 27-8. Indeed, and on a related point, the geographical constraints also preclude the 
use of such European sovereign CDS indices for general EU risks that do not include all Member 
States or pan-euro Member States in the index. In particular, the ability to use sovereign CDS indices to 
cross-country hedge credit valuation adjustments concerning exposures in several Member States has 
been restricted (broadly, such credit valuation adjustments account for the risk of possible changes to 
the credit quality of a counterparty in a derivatives transaction).  Such a limitation is also counter to the 
post-crisis European banking reforms that include the use of index CDSs for the purpose of mitigating 
such risk, see Deutsche Bank, ESMA Call for Evidence (n 172) 9. 
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rules provide for a temporary ‘opt-out’ provision. Consequently the constraints may 
be temporarily suspended by a national competent authority (‘NCA’) where it has 
objective grounds for believing its debt market is not functioning properly and that 
such restrictions may have a negative impact on the sovereign CDS market, especially 
by increasing the cost of borrowing for sovereign issuers or affecting the ability to 
issue new debt.176 Such grounds include high or rising interest rates on the sovereign 
debt; and a widening of sovereign CDS spreads compared with other issuers.177  
 
Before suspending any restrictions, the authority must notify ESMA and the other 
NCAs (and ESMA shall issue an opinion within twenty-four hours but has no veto 
option).178 A suspension is valid for an initial twelve-month period and can be 
renewed for six-month periods.179 Where a NCA suspends restrictions, notifications 
of uncovered positions will then be required on reaching or falling below relevant 
thresholds.180 Further, it should also be observed that although ESMA has been 
granted broad powers in the Regulation with respect to other financial instruments in 
emergency situations, sovereign debt is expressly excluded.181 In such scenarios 
ESMA has very limited powers, including for instance the right to be fully informed 
of relevant developments.182 
 
It is somewhat ironic that an opt-out has been included in the rules in the event that 
the CDS restrictions increase the cost of borrowing for sovereign issuers when this 
was precisely the rationale behind introducing the provisions in the first place. Indeed, 
there is also an added paradox here in that it is precisely at the times when such opt-
out powers can be exercised with respect to sovereign CDSs that regulators may be 
also restricting other forms of short selling.183 
 
1.5.3 Impact of the Sovereign CDS Restrictions  
Regulatory intervention brings significant risks with it and the imposition of 
restrictions in the area of sovereign CDSs is all the more concerning when there is 
                                                
176 Regulation 236/2012, art 14(2). Note that the relevant competent authority in relation to sovereign 
debt of a Member State is defined in article 2(1)(j)(i) as the competent authority of that Member State 
to which the CDS relates, see also Juurikkala (n 117) 334. 
177 Regulation 236/2012 art 14(2)(a)-(e). 
178 Ibid art 14(2). Separately, note that in exceptional circumstances competent authorities can also 
restrict the ability to enter into covered sovereign CDS positions, see ibid art 21. 
179 Ibid art 14(2).   
180 Ibid art 8. 
181 For a discussion of ESMA’s powers in the Regulation and the related UK’s constitutional challenge 
to these powers, see e.g. Elizabeth Howell, ‘The European Court of Justice: Selling Us Short?’ (2014) 
11 ECFR 454. 
182 Regulation 236/2012 art 29; Juurikkala (n 117) 335-6. 
183 Juurikkala (n 117) 337-8. Further, such decisions may not necessarily be made by the same 
regulator. For instance the relevant competent authority for sovereign CDSs are covered by the 
regulator of the Member State to which the CDS relates. In contrast the relevant competent authority 
for shares and other financial instruments is the national regulator controlling the most relevant market 
in terms of liquidity for that instrument, see Regulation 236/2012, art 2(1)(j)(i) and (v). 
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little indication that such activity raises sovereign funding costs.184  Indeed there are 
many benefits to using sovereign CDSs, yet little to substantiate the allegations aired 
by governments and regulators during the sovereign debt crisis. With this in mind the 
EU rules that have been introduced in this area are an example of a ‘misconceived 
response to a non-existent problem’.185  
 
It is recognised that, given the relatively short period the Regulation has been in 
operation, plus the improved situation in the sovereign debt markets, it is hard to fully 
ascertain the effect that the sovereign CDS restrictions have had.186 Nevertheless, as 
ESMA’s evaluation of the Regulation (the’ Evaluation’) also demonstrates, it does 
appear clear that the sovereign CDS restrictions seem to be driving participants away 
from using the sovereign CDS market in practice. In particular, ESMA’s Evaluation 
illustrates that the sovereign CDS constraints have led to a predictable shift to other 
asset classes: for instance open interest in futures contracts has increased (especially 
on French and Italian bonds).187 Indeed, such activity will always occur when 
regulation covers only one aspect of a market: market participants will seek to avoid 
the additional costs of regulation and will redirect their market activity to the 
unregulated market: the ‘boundary problem’.188  
 
In the context of sovereign CDSs this poses a problem for regulators since there are 
‘literally an infinite number of potential contracts and contract forms that can be used 
by investors to share and transfer credit risk’.189 Indeed, aside from the observed shifts 
to government future contracts, participants could also choose to short the underlying 
bonds, use corporate CDSs190 as a proxy for a sovereign CDS, and also utilise more 
opaque and customised OTC derivatives contracts. Further and with this in mind, 
there are also regulatory inconsistencies that enhance this issue through policymakers 
choosing to treat sovereign CDSs differently to corporate CDSs. With this in mind, 
regulators should not hold too much confidence in the European restrictions 
proscribing the area of contracting in the marketplace.191  
 
It is also clear that the rules may reduce investor interest in the underlying bond 
market in many countries, and this could raise the cost of debt issuance for such 
                                                
184 Moloney (n 93) 542; IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 2. 
185 Seretakis (n 7) 146. 
186 Indeed it has also been observed that peripheral sovereigns were more stable following the 
announcement of the outright monetary transactions (‘OMT’) plan by the European Central Bank 
(‘ECB’) in September 2012. Broadly this plan enables government bond buying by the ECB: it can 
engage in OMTs to address distortions in the government bond markets provided the country complies 
with certain strict requirements in relation to their economic policies, see e.g. ‘ECB's Mario Draghi 
Unveils Bond-Buying Euro Debt Plan’ BBC News, (6 September 2012). 
187 ESMA (n 167) 94.  
188 Markus Brunnermeier and others, ‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation’ (Geneva 
Reports on the World Economy, 2009), Appendix; Henderson (n 132) 33.  
189 Henderson (n 132) 33. 
190 Indeed it has also been argued that the corporate CDS market faces the stronger theoretical rationale 
for regulation than the sovereign market, see Juurikkala (n 117) 331. 
191 With thanks to Professors John Armour and Luca Enriques for their comments in this regard. 
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sovereign issuers: precisely what the rules were seeking to prevent. 192  Finally, 
although commercial parties may work out with time how to ‘game’ the rules to their 
advantage,193 this does not excuse the introduction of an unreasonable ban in the first 
place. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
The unsubstantiated accusations that speculative CDS activity aggravated the 
financial problems of sovereign issuers during the sovereign debt crisis resulted in the 
introduction of a permanent prohibition on all naked sovereign CDS activity. Indeed, 
the Regulation’s restrictions go much further than only prohibiting uncovered 
positions and also eliminate much legitimate hedging activity. Market participants are 
rightly anxious of breaching opaque correlation tests, and the geographical limitations 
are also of concern, running counter to the principles behind a single European 
market.  
 
The paper suggests that this regulatory intervention is unjustified, and that market 
participants, including those not targeted by the ban, are withdrawing from the 
market.194 Activity will simply be transferred to other less transparent markets, and 
the restrictions may also have the unintended consequence of reducing interest in the 
sovereign bond market. The economic literature and evidence that the paper has 
considered does not support the introduction of a ban: rather it would have been far 
more sensible to have engaged in tackling the underlying fiscal problems of particular 
Member States than simply seeking to prohibit the symptoms of the problem.  
 
Finally, although commercial parties may work out how to use the rules to their 
advantage, this does not merit the introduction of the rules in the first place. One 
should always remain wary of ‘knee-jerk’ regulatory reforms, and in this regard it is 
the policymakers and not the speculators who have sold us short. 
  
                                                
192 AIMA, AIMA/MFA Response to the Call for Evidence by ESMA (15 March 2013) 11; IMF, A New 
Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 17. This is particularly so where such 
countries do not have alternative markets for expressing views about negative sovereign credit risk. 
193 For instance, ambiguities inherent in the drafting of the rules could grant commercial participants 
with more room to manoeuvre around the restrictions going forward. 
194 IMF, A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (n 20) 21. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Basis points One basis point is equal to 1/100th of one 
per cent. A one per cent change is equal 
to one hundred basis points. 
Basis trading Arbitrage trading where traders try to 
exploit pricing differences between CDSs 
and the underlying debt obligations by 
taking offsetting positions between the 
two. For instance, depending on the basis, 
a trader can purchase the underlying bond 
and buy CDS protection and lock in a 
risk-free profit and vice versa. 
CDS premium or spread Specified fee payments the CDS 
purchaser is obliged to make on an 
annual basis. If the premium or spread 
increases, this means that the likelihood 
of an entity defaulting is increasing. 
‘Dynamic’ hedging strategy A strategy that accommodates constant 
changes in risk exposure such as credit 
value adjustments (such adjustments 
account for the risk that the 
creditworthiness of the counterparty 
deteriorates). 
Granger causality tests Broadly this is a statistical concept of 
causality based on prediction that can be 
used in determining a weak form of 
causality. However such tests can suffer 
from limitations where variables are 
omitted.  
Hedging ‘tail risk’ events Tail risk is similar to an anticipated 
correlation. Although an asset may not be 
correlated with a sovereign CDS on a 
day-to-day basis, it would be expected to 
have a high level of correlation if there 
was a tail risk event, such as severe 
market turmoil. Such hedging is an 
important risk mitigation tool and is 
usually encouraged by regulators. In 
general however it is not possible to use a 
sovereign CDS to hedge against tail risk 
events. 
Notional amount The level of CDS protection is usually 
expressed in terms of a notional amount 
being protected. 
Naked or uncovered sovereign CDS Where an investor purchases a sovereign 
CDS without having some kind of 
exposure to the credit risk associated with 
the underlying bond. 
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Pearson’s correlation coefficient Broadly this is a statistic that measures 
the correlation between sets of data. It is 
a measure (between -1 and +1) of how 
well the sets of data are related. 
Proxy hedging Hedging risks of other assets whose value 
is correlated to the value of the sovereign 
debt. 
‘Static’ hedging strategy  Where the sovereign CDS position is 
hedging a direct exposure to a sovereign 
or public sector body in the sovereign. 
‘Trade tear-ups’ (also referred to as 
‘portfolio compression’) 
This is an industry technique that broadly 
means economically redundant 
derivatives trades are terminated early 
without changing the net position of each 
market participant. 
Vector Error Correction Model 
(‘VECM’) 
Cointegrated variables move together in 
the long run but there can be deviations 
from each other in the short run, which 
means they follow an adjustment process 
towards equilibrium. A model that 
considers this adjustment process is the 
VECM. This model also has its 
drawbacks however: it requires the CDS-
bond basis to be sufficiently ‘stable’ or 
stationary and therefore limits it to those 
countries that have a stable basis (far 
from all countries). 
 
Appendix 2  
 
Overview of Main Empirical Studies: Interaction between the Sovereign 
CDS and Bond Markets1 
 
Emerging Markets 
 
Chan-Lau and Sook-Kim (2004) 
Period March 2001 – May 2003 
Purpose of 
Study 
Authors examine whether the bond or sovereign CDS markets lead the 
other. 
Data Set Authors test a sample of 8 emerging market countries using daily data.2 
To undertake cross-country comparisons they used country bond 
indices3 and CDS spreads were mid-price quotes on 5-year contracts. 
Main 
Findings 
Very mixed results and authors conclude it is very difficult to conclude 
that one market particularly dominated in terms of price discovery. 
 
 
Levy (2009) 
Period Approximately 4 years (between 2000-2008) 
Purpose 
of Study 
To explain pricing deviations between sovereign CDS premiums and 
bond spreads, author focuses on two frictions: liquidity and counterparty 
risk.  
Data Set Authors use daily data on 5-year sovereign CDS premiums (daily quotes) 
and 5-year sovereign bond yields (daily quotes) for 16 emerging market 
countries.  
Main 
Findings 
The findings strongly support the relevance of these two frictions to the 
pricing of CDSs. The relative illiquidity of CDSs has a positive effect on 
CDS prices and counterparty risk has a negative effect on CDS prices. 
The findings also support the suggestion that changes in the relative 
liquidity of the two markets could explain why there was no consistent 
pattern of one market leading the other: price discovery took place on the 
market where there was higher liquidity on a given day. 
 
  
                                                
1 Note that the literature largely adopts a common approach to testing whether the two markets are 
integrated i.e. it considers whether they are characterised by a long-term stationary relationship and 
then looks at short-term deviations to this to work out which market adapts to each other. The literature 
uses either: a standard information measure to assess contribution to price discovery (either a 
‘Hasbrouck’ or ‘Gonzalo and Granger’ information measure) that is based on a VECM model; or it 
uses a ‘Granger causality’ model (a statistical concept of causality based on prediction). 
2 The authors use both VECM and Granger causality measures. It is recognised that as these are 
emerging market countries it is difficult to know how generalisable the findings are. 
3 Note that using indices lacks the transparency to enable a price comparison between the CDSs and the 
actual underlying bonds.  
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Ammer and Cai (2011) 
Period February 2001-March 2005 
Purpose of 
Study 
Authors examine whether the bond or sovereign CDS markets lead the 
other. 
Data Set Authors use daily data on 5-year dollar denominated sovereign CDS 
premiums and daily estimates of the yield on a 5-year par coupon dollar 
sovereign bond. Authors examine 9 emerging economies. 
Main 
Findings 
Results suggest sovereign CDS markets seem to lead bond markets in 
price discovery only in some instances and lag bond prices in others.4 
Authors also conclude the relative liquidity of the two markets is a key 
determinant of where price discovery occurred.5 
 
 European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
 
Commission Task Force Report (2010) 
Period 2008-1st quarter of 2010 
Purpose 
of Study 
Examine sovereign CDS activity during the European sovereign debt 
crisis to examine whether the bond or CDS markets preceded or lagged 
the other. 
Data Set Empirical analysis of 18 EU countries: 
1) Authors use correlation analysis to show whether price changes on 
one of the two markets preceded the others between 2009-2010.  
2) Authors then take this further using Granger causality tests. Examine 
the period between 2008 - 1st quarter of 2010.6 
Main 
Findings 
No evidence of obvious mispricing in either the CDS or bond markets 
and CDS spreads are cheap relative to bond spreads. 
Correlation analysis shows that spreads in the two markets are mainly 
contemporaneous. 
Granger causality tests find price discovery is equally likely to occur in 
either market (for Greece and Italy, the bond market seemed to be the 
more important market; for Spain and Ireland, the CDS market seemed to 
be more important; for Portugal it went both ways). 
 
  
                                                
4 The authors use the VECM analysis. Again, given these are emerging market countries it is difficult 
to know how generalisable these findings are.  
5 Broadly they suggested that as much of the relevant information with respect to sovereign credit risk 
tends to be in the public domain, new information might be reflected in observed prices more quickly 
in the more liquid market (cf corporate markets: if this is driven more by informed trading then price 
discovery may occur in least transparent market that might tend to be less liquid market). This contrasts 
with Arce et al’s findings that are discussed further below, which found that the degree of liquidity 
does not affect price discovery.  
6 The report noted the VECM analysis but also observed its drawbacks (i.e. requiring CDS-bond basis 
to be sufficiently stable and this would limit the analysis to those countries with such a stable basis). 
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Fontana and Scheider (ECB Working Paper 2010) 
Period January 2006-July 2010 
Purpose 
of Study 
As part of a broader study they analyse which market leads in the pricing 
process. 
Data Set Although weekly data is used for other aspects of their research, they use 
daily data on CDS and bond spreads to obtain a better overview of the 
pricing dynamics. Examine 10-year CDS and bond spreads for 10-euro 
area countries.7 
Main 
Findings 
In line with the Task Force Report, they find in half the sample countries 
price discovery takes place in the CDS market and in the other half it is 
observed in the bond market. (They found the bond market has a 
predominant role in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria and 
Belgium; and the CDS market has a major role for the PIIGS countries).   
 
 
Delis and Mylondis (2011) 
Period January 2005-May 2010 
Purpose 
of Study 
Examines the interrelation between government bond spreads and CDSs. 
Data Set Daily data on 10-year government bond yields and 10-year euro 
denominated CDS mid bid-ask prices for Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain.8 
Main 
Findings 
The authors suggest that in times of high stress, investors have a higher 
preference for less risky and more liquid securities and generally this 
benefits government bonds as they are typically regarded as less risky 
than other asset classes. During the debt crisis however, south European 
bonds become more risky and their spreads to German government bonds 
soar. The authors conclude that in such times the ‘flight to safety’ to 
German government bonds becomes more pronounced (fewer would be 
trading south European bonds and CDSs), disrupting the transmission 
mechanism from CDS to bond spreads. Notably they conclude that the 
findings mitigate the common conception of speculative attacks on 
countries’ default. 
 
  
                                                
7 The authors use VECM analysis and used 10-year spreads as this is a common horizon for 
government bonds. 
8 Authors used ‘rolling’ Granger causality tests and included an error correction term to account for the 
existence of cointegration between CDS and bond spreads. 
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Palladini and Portes (2011) 
Period January 2004-March 2011 
Purpose of 
Study 
Examines the price discovery relationship between CDS spreads and 
sovereign bond yields. 
Data Set Examines 6 European countries using daily 5-year sovereign bond 
yields and CDS spreads.9  
Main 
Findings 
Findings suggest that the CDS market plays a leadership role in terms 
of price discovery. Results are more in line with those relating to 
corporate credit risk. 
 
 
O’Kane (2012) 
Period January 2008-January 2011 
Purpose of 
Study 
Examine the relationship between sovereign CDSs and bonds. 
Data Set Considers the PIIGS countries and France and examines the daily close 
prices on 5-year CDSs and bonds.10 
Main 
Findings 
Finds price discovery is evenly split between the CDS and bond markets. 
O’Kane finds the dominant direction was CDSs to bonds for Greece; 
bonds to CDSs for Italy and France; and Portugal and Ireland exhibits 
causality in both directions. 
 
 
Coudert and Gex (2013) 
Period January 2007-March 2010 
Purpose of 
Study 
Examines the interaction between the CDS and bond market. 
Data Set Uses daily data: generic 5-year CDS premia and matching bond spreads 
for 18 countries (11 European and 7 emerging countries).11 
Main 
Findings 
Finds bond market tends to lead sovereign CDS market in line with 
huge size of government debt market compared with CDS market. 
Results are more mitigated for high-yield countries however. 
 
  
                                                
9 Authors use VECM analysis and Granger causality tests. 
10 O’Kane uses the Granger causality measure as he found that cointegration was ruled out for all 
countries aside from France and Spain. 
11 Authors use the VECM measure however they investigated short-term interactions using Granger 
causality but note that cointegration can lead to spurious results when Granger causality is used. 
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Arce, Mayordomo and Peña (2013) 
Period January 2004-February 2012 
Purpose 
of Study 
Examines which market leads the credit risk price discovery process. 
Data Set Daily 5-year sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads for 11 European 
Monetary Union (‘EMU’) countries.12  
Main 
Findings 
Analysis reveals that price discovery is ‘state dependent’ (broadly this 
means that different market conditions and factors affect it). For instance 
levels of counterparty risk affect the ability of the CDS market to lead the 
price discovery process, whereas funding costs (that affect bond buyers 
more than CDS buyers) worsens the efficiency of the bond market.13  
The findings suggests that CDS markets lead price discovery in most 
euro areas in normal times but during times of acute stress in the 
Eurozone the bond market leads the price discovery process.14 
 
BIS (2013) 
Period October 2008-May 2011 
Purpose 
of Study 
Examines which market is most important in terms of price discovery of 
sovereign credit risk. 
Data Set Intraday quotes for PIIGs, France and Germany. As the number of 
transactions of sovereign bonds is largely insufficient to conduct 
meaningful intraday analysis, the authors use the trading book or ‘best 
proposal’ quotes from the respective domestic markets. They also use 5 
and 10-year USD denominated sovereign CDS quotes.15 
Main 
Findings 
Find that CDS prices tend to move first in response to news and that bond 
prices tend to adjust towards pricing in the CDS market.16  
                                                
12 Authors extend the VECM analysis over time using ‘rolling windows’ (of 1000 days).  
13 They also suggested that other factors impaired the ability of the CDS market to lead the price 
discovery process. Factors included the common volatility in the EMU equity markets (the authors 
suggested that information in bond spreads may be more reliable at such times), and banks’ agreements 
to accept losses on their holdings of Greek bonds without activating CDS contracts (they suggested this 
meant there was a lack of confidence in the CDS markets after such agreements). Factors affecting the 
ability of the bond market to lead the price discovery process included investors’ flight to safety to the 
safest financial assets (they suggested this could diminish the demand of most EMU countries’ debt), 
and ECB intervention in the bond markets (the authors suggested that if its demand for debt is 
insensitive to price, the information embedded in prices formed could reveal less about the fundamental 
value of the bonds). 
14 Notably the authors find that the degree of liquidity in the CDS market relative to the bond market 
does not affect the price discovery process (in contrast to e.g. Ammer and Cai). They attribute this 
finding to the special features of the period (i.e. a period of financial stress and limited access to 
funding). The authors suggest that at such times a major determinant of the degree of investors’ 
participation in the bond market will be the availability and cost of funding rather than the size of the 
bid-ask spread. Also the relative importance of the bid-ask spread could be of secondary importance 
when big players such as the ECB are buying bonds without regard to it. 
15 Authors use a VECM approach. 
16 Authors observed their findings could not directly be used to address the extent higher CDS spreads 
were likely to result in higher bond market credit spreads and lower bond prices than would be 
warranted by fundamentals. 
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IMF (2013) 
Period March 2009-September 2012 
Purpose 
of Study 
Within a broader study, the IMF examines which market leads the price 
discovery process.17 
Data Set Examines 33 countries (advanced and emerging market economies). 
Statistics were estimated at the country level. 18 
Main 
Findings 
Informational value of CDSs has become more important but varies 
widely over countries and time. Finds that sovereign CDSs incorporate 
information faster as CDS liquidity increases and that sovereign CDSs 
tend to reveal information quicker in advanced economies during times 
of stress. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 The IMF also examines sovereign CDS spreads and suggests they reflect the same economical 
fundamentals and other factors (including market microstructure factors (i.e. bid-ask spreads) as the 
underlying bonds. The IMF observed that sovereign CDSs provided a good hedge to offset sovereign 
credit risk, thereby enhancing financial stability. 
18 Authors use the Hasbrouck statistic using the VECM method. 
